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IT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE COURT TO DECLINE
TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE SURETIES CLAIM WHEN THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY ACTUAL DAMAGE WAS INCURRED
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the sureties claim based on
the absence of a showing that they had paid any claims under the FMC Bond.
Patricia Hayes & Assocs. v. Cammell Laird Holdings U.K.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
339 F.3d 76
(Decided August, 5, 2003)
Appellant-interveners Greenwich Insurance Co. and NAC Insurance Co.
("sureties") appealed an order by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York denying their motion to intervene. Accompanying the sureties
motion to intervene were allegations that they had maritime liens against Big Red Boat II
("BRBII"), which entitled them to enforce those liens in rem against BRBII.
Patricia Hayes & Associates, Inc. ("Hayes") and Smithall Electronics, Inc.
("Smithall") filed complaints against the BRBII, International Shipping Partners ("ISP"),
Premier Cruises, Inc. ("Premier") and the Master of the BRBII (collectively "the
defendants") alleging that they were entitled to an arrest warrant for the BRBII because
of maritime liens held against the vessel. On September 15, 2000, Southern Marine
Electric Company ("Southern Marine") and Alpha Marine ("Alpha Marine") filed similar
complaints against the defendants. The district court signed the arrest warrants pursuant
to Supplemental Rule C of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on September 15, 2000.
When BRBII entered the district on Saturday, September 16, 2000, it was seized by
United States Marshals. Following the arrest of the BRBII, the sureties filed their motion
to intervene. The district court signed an order consolidating all claims filed against the
defendants on September 28, 2000 and granted all motions to intervene regarding all
uncontested claims. Once the majority of claims against BRBII were settled, the vessel
was released from arrest on November 10, 2000.
The claims raised by the sureties are related to a bond they issued to Premier.
Although Premier did not own the BRBJI, the vessel had been chartered from its owners
and operated by Premier as a part of its fleet. Procedurally, Premier is legally required to
prove financial ability to refund any unearned passenger deposits before a carrier can
transport passengers for hire from U.S. ports. In order to meet this requirement, Premier
had the sureties post a Federal Maritime Commission Passenger Vessel Surety Bond
("FMC Bond"), which covered Premier's entire fleet of six vessels. Coverage was
limited to $5 million per vessel and $ 15 million collectively. The consideration for the
FMC Bond was an agreement by Premier to pay a premium and indemnify the sureties
for all "losses, costs, and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees."
At the time Premier ceased operations in the fall of 2000, there remained
outstanding passenger ticket deposits for the BRBII's future trips in the amount of
$2,3 1 0,028.44. In addition, due to the cancellation of several summer 2000 voyages by
BRBII, the sureties claimed that they were exposed to total potential liability of $5

10

million. However, the sureties never actually paid any claims under the FMC Bond.
Although the primary issue the parties referred to in their briefs was whether an FMC
Bond constitutes a maritime contract and whether a maritime lien can attach to a party
pursuant to payments under the FMC Bond, the Court of Appeals found that the present
case did not require the court to reach those issues because the sureties' motion to
intervene and ensuing filings did not allege that they had made any payment under the
FMC Bond.
The court established that in order to intervene as of right, "the applicant must: ( 1)
file a timely motion; (2) show an interest in the litigation; (3) show that its interests may
be impaired by the disposition of the action; and (4) show that its interest is not
adequately protected by the parties to the action." In re Holocaust Victim Assets
Litigation, 225 F.3d 19 1, 197 (2d Cir. 2000). A maritime lien is "a special property right
in the vessel. . .as security for a debt or claim ... [which] arises when the debt arises and
grants the creditor the right to seize the vessel, have it sold, and be repaid the debt from
the proceeds." !tel Containers lnt'l Corp. v. Atlanttrai
f k Express Serv. Ltd. , 982 F.2d 765
(2d Cir. 1992).
In the present action, the sureties argue that amounts due under the FMC Bond
entitle them to maritime liens against the BRBII. In addition, the sureties argue that
passengers who had paid for a trip on the BRBII but did not redeem it were thereby given
the right to maritime liens against the BRBII and those sureties, as payors of those
claims, were thereby subrogated to those liens. However, the court found that the
sureties' claims could not become ripe so as to justify granting a maritime lien against
BRBII until there were amounts due under the FMC Bond. Contrary to the sureties'
claims, the court repeatedly established that there was no money owed, nor had there
been any amounts paid by the sureties under the FMC Bond that would thereby give rise
to a maritime lien against the BRBII. Therefore, the court found no error in the district
court's finding that the sureties' claims were not ripe.
The sureties additionally relied upon Greenwich Marine, Inc. v. S.S. Alexandra,
339 F.2d 90 1 (2d Cir. 1965) and The Lassell, 193 F. 539 (E.D. Pa. 19 12) to assert that a
maritime claim can be filed prior to a breach of a maritime contract if the potential breach
of contract is apparent. The court struck down this argument, clarifying that the cited
cases only establish that a district court has the discretion to proceed on a premature
claim. In denying the sureties motion to intervene, the district court noted that the
sureties had not yet paid any claims amounts on the bond, and that the sureties were
holding $3.7 million in cash collateral for any potential claims to be paid. These factors
established there was no abuse of discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction. The
court instead concluded that the lack of payments by sureties proves that their claims
against the BRBII were dubious and therefore unable to be adjudicated. For the forgoing
reasons the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
to deny the sureties' motion to intervene.
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